Dec. 29, 2012: Fed's summary of fiscal cliff; more thoughts on different loan originator standards; who out there is over 100?
Rob Chrisman
Yesterday
someone asked me about the fiscal cliff. "Fiscal what?" I
asked. "Never heard of it." Seriously, just as most folks grew
tired of the jabbering about the election in the score of
months leading up to it, we're probably pretty tired of
hearing how Congress and the president can't reach an
agreement over a deadline they themselves imposed (see
“joke” at the bottom). Why spend a lot of time summing
the fiscal cliff up when our very own Dallas Federal
Reserve put out a nice piece yesterday summing up the six
major attributes of what may happen on Jan. 1? Here you go: http://www.dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2012/el1214.cfm.
Who
is going to give a 30-yr fixed rate mortgage to a hundred year
old person? Maybe the better question is, "What 100-yr old is
going to ask for a loan - and can a lender deny it based on
age?" (That is rhetorical - don't write back.) The 2010
Census counted 53,364 people age 100 and older in the United
States, and they were overwhelmingly female. For every
100 centenarian women, there were only 21 centenarian men.
According to the report, the population 100 and older made up
a small proportion of the total U.S. population — representing
less than two per 10,000 people. As you’d expect, more than
half were 100 or 101 (92% were between 100 and 104).
Centenarian women were slightly more likely to live in a
nursing home (35%), and centenarian men were more likely to be
living with others in a household (44%) than any other living
arrangement. In 2010, 86% of centenarians lived in an urban
area. Most lived in the South (17,444), followed by the
Midwest (13,112), Northeast (12,244) and West (10,564). States
with the largest total populations generally had the most
centenarians. California had the largest number of
centenarians (5,921), followed by New York, Florida and Texas.
Alaska had the fewest centenarians (40), followed by Wyoming
(72), Vermont (133) and Delaware (146).
This
week the commentary has discussed the apparently “hot” topic
of licensing and education for depository and
non-depository loan originators. I continue to receive
comments from both sides of the fence.
"All this 'stuff' about tests does not matter. Education
is fine, but our industry is one that on-the-job-training is
paramount. When I started in the business I was part of
a bank commercial loan department. I processed files, typed
loan docs, co-ordinate closing with escrow, collected interest
payments, processed demands and recons when loan paid off.
Outside of economics 101, I had absolutely no background in
lending. I did not know how to spell LOAN. My boss taught me
who, what, why, where, and when. Everything was done by hand
with calculator and typewriter. I still have my HP and the
formula to calculate an APR. I did take numerous classes.
Remember Scott Potter's ‘How to Analyze Tax Return and
Financial Statements”? Best class I ever took, and still works
today. Now, even after taking my state test and the NMLS
test, which I passed with 95%, I still don't know which Act
does what. But, I do know I cannot discriminate for any
reason, that I have a fiduciary responsibly to my clients and
my company. Common sense tells me pretty much what I can and
cannot do, but realize regulators can’t bank on that. But my
point is that taking a few classes and passing a test does
not make you a loan officer. We are not born with the
knowledge to process a loan. Some truly LEARN how to do the
job well. Others just muddle through, and get paid in spite of
themselves just like any other profession. The part that irks
me is the double standard: everyone should have the same
requirements. It is known as ‘discrimination’ if one group is
treated different than the other."
And another: “We have all heard CFPB continually state they
want a level playing field. As I recall, I saw the same phrase
in the beginning of the RFA from 1980. The real irony here is
that the SAFE Act was originally charged to HUD. HUD was
required, but never did, compose a SBREFA Panel and Report
that I have been able to locate (Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act). Recently, the CFPB included
discussions of the SAFE Act in their SBREFA Panel, however
when pushed they said they ‘didn’t want to re-open SAFE at
this time.’ So why was it included in the proposal if it
wasn’t open for discussion? The SAFE Act should only have to
levels of debate upon implementation: 1). Does it help the
consumer and 2). Is it anti small business?
“For better or worse, bank LO and non-bank LO’s receive a
different education. But well beyond the education is when
MLOs have utilized the ‘system’ too often hide their record
behind a bank charter. This is not in anyone’s interest.
Sadly, it would appear that the regulators are more interested
in MDIA violations (exceeding the $100 violation) vs. whether
the LO's or MLOs on either side are incompliance with SAFE Act
(beyond the mere written word but to the intent). I
continually hear that MLOs are operating under others' NMLS
numbers or have simply created NMLS numbers. The regulators
were made aware and have selectively chosen to ignore or
investigate this issue. I will not go forth with the debate
that every bank conducting background checks. If they all do
excellent, however it would appear that the ability to
overlook some indiscretions that would otherwise exceed the
varying state restrictions. I was told, face to face, by a
regulator's auditor that this type of fraud did not directly
impact the consumer and he wasn't interested.
“SAFE was an excellent concept. It was loosely based upon the
Florida registry. Sadly, the big hole in the Florida registry
is the same downfall of the SAFE Act. I have heard many claim
that the cost would be prohibitive for the banks to have LOs
meet the non-banks MLO requirements, however almost every one
of these banks has a FINRA Registered Rep in the bank branches
at similar costs. Additionally, it was the basis of SAFE to
have the cost placed upon the MLO, thus the MLO places their
money, time and License at risk if they engage in
inappropriate actions. Again, it is the MLOs skin in the game.
The most troubling aspect of the oversight of SAFE, in its
current format, is the transition. MLOs, in many states cannot
transition from non-banks to banks and back to non-banks
without losing their licenses in the transition. This is
counter to the FINRA RR and would benefit the banks over the
small business entities that RFA claims to protect. Further,
this flies in the face of the MLO having something to lose, or
their skin in the game. Some have said this falls on the state
regulators while others call it a revenue stream. This
prohibited practice of anti-business, was absolutely not the
purpose of the SAFE Act.
RFA required the SAFE Act to have a SBREFA Panel and Report.
When the cost per loan officer often exceeds $1,200 for just
the first state licensing, excluding annual renewal, while a
bank cost is $86 for authority to lend in all 50 states and
the commonwealths, this is a simple disgrace. For anyone to
argue that the SAFE Act, in its current application, is not
anti-small business is a blatant lie.”
Lastly
this note, “Regardless of where an originator works, we, as an
industry, cannot assure that all have met the same standard. I
am certain some of the 4,000+ exempted banks have far better
training. But many do the bare minimum. The fact is that
many LO's who have failed the test have been hired by banks
where the test is not required. There is evidence of that. And
if the public wanted to, via some kind of class action
lawsuit, or some regulator took it upon themselves, the loan
officer licensing exam can be challenged based on the way it
has been implemented and the role of the individual states in
setting their own requirements. As I understand employment
law, the content of any test or a testing requirement itself
must be shown to be germane to the job requirements if is to
withstand legal scrutiny. We have seen this in the successful
challenges to the tests for promotion within police and fire
departments. The fact that regulated institutions are exempt
from the testing and licensing requirements undercuts the
legal basis for the test and licensing requirement. If the
piecemeal requirement were imposed by a private business or
local government, it would have been tossed out a long time
ago. I think the key point is that unless the regulators can
certify that the alternatives to licensing and testing offered
by the regulated institutions are, at a minimum, the
equivalent of the NMLS, the NMLS requirements to not pass
muster as being germane to what a loan officer does and is
therefore open to the same legal challenges that have mounted
against other employment testing. And the individual state
requirements also undercut the legal basis for the test:
unless a state can justify why its incremental requirements
are germane to doing business as a loan officer in that state
versus any other state, the unique state requirements are not
defensible under labor law.”
The
writer continued, “As for the small institution argument that
they only make a few loans year and therefore should not need
to licensed, I am not aware of any other small institution
exemptions under QM, servicing, LO compensation, fair lending,
or any other requirements, so why this one? Saying a LO does
not need to be tested or licensed because that LO only makes a
few loans a year is like saying someone does not need to be
licensed and tested to carry a concealed weapon because they
promise to only carry it a few days a year. It is even more
important to license the occasional loan officer because they
will not have the experience gained from seeing many
applications and situations and the education will make up for
some of that lack of experience. My suggestion is that the
industry’s strategy is twofold. First, make it clear to
the regulators and the states that it is going after the legal
basis for the licensing and testing requirements because the
exemptions and individual state requirements are prima facie
evidence that that they are not crucial to actually being a
loan officer. I think there is a disparate impact argument
under labor law that would help this case. Second, I would
push the regulators to require the exempt institutions to
certify in detail their internal testing and hiring
requirements, and make them subject to their own set of
regulations for LO qualifications. If the compliance burden
is too great, or the potential penalties for a compliance
error too severe, the regulated institutions might jump at the
chance to simply run their LOs through the NMLS. Think also
of the headline risk: "Examiners find XYZ Bank employed
several ex-felons as loan officers." The licensing exemption
would disappear overnight. In discussions with the banks, we
could simply say that we see this on the horizon and the
easiest solution is to go along with expanding the NMLS
requirement.”
(Today’s “joke” is from the Borowitz Report.)
WASHINGTON - The international terror group known as Al Qaeda
announced its dissolution today, saying that “our mission of
destroying the American economy is now in the capable hands of
the U.S. Congress.”
In an official statement published on the group’s website, the
current leader of Al Qaeda said that Congress’s conduct during
the so-called “fiscal-cliff” showdown convinced the terrorists
that they had been outdone.
“We’ve been working overtime trying to come up with ways to
terrorize the American people and wreck their economy,” said
the statement from Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. “But
even we couldn’t come up with something like this.”
Mr. al-Zawhiri said that the idea of holding the entire nation
hostage with a clock ticking down to the end of the year “is
completely insane and worthy of a Bond villain.”
“As terrorists, every now and then you have to step back and
admire when someone else has beaten you at your own game,” he
said. “This is one of those times.”
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